So I kind of quit blogging, because it was taking me too much time to develop and refine the things I wanted to write about, which is both unproductive in general and not great blogging in practice in particular. But this week I was caught by an idea I could get figured out fairly quickly.
It stems from this New Republic post bemoaning the tendency to blame the government shutdown (and ideological extremism in general) on gerrymandering. This is basically correct. The idea behind your garden variety gerrymandering is to pack as many of your opponents voters into as few districts as you can, giving them a few very safe seats and you the bulk of the seats, but with narrow margins. If you do it right, you wind up with something like Pennsylvania, which voted for Barack Obama in 2012, and also gave 13 of its 18 House seats to Republicans. But also if you do it right, you’re winning a bunch of 52-48 districts, which means you should be incentivized to run relatively moderate candidates. So it’s not a very attractive explanation for systemic polarization or individual extremism.
But what is? Well one clear one is the willingness of far-right conservatives to mount primary challenges against Republican incumbents. This is an asymmetric strategy, as liberals are far less able or willing to mount such campaigns against incumbent Democrats. Primaries are low turnout elections, and the strongly ideological are the most likely voters. That means that Republican challengers come from the right, and challenged incumbents must move right to meet them. In theory, this should make the winner of the primary (whether the incumbent or the challenger) more vulnerable in the general election, because they’ve moved away from the median voter, and the Democratic nominee can move to the center in response. And indeed, this is essentially the dynamic that we’ve seen with the awful Senate candidates the GOP has put up in the last two cycles — they are far enough to the right to win a primary contested strictly among ultra-conservatives, but the statewide electorate wants nothing to do with them.
OK, so how does the House differ? There are a few key factors here. First, Senate campaigns get much more attention from national media and the national parties than House campaigns do, on average. So when Todd Akin talks about “legitimate rape,” it becomes national news. When Kerry Bentivolio (now the Representative from Michigan’s 11th district) is called “mentally unbalanced” by his own brother, it doesn’t. Additionally, Senators don’t have districts, they have states, which experience less change than districts do based on either demographics or map changes (the latter of which never happen for states). At the district-level, voters are gradually self-segregating along political lines, creating safer districts without necessarily gerrying the mander. This has the potential to make party ID even more salient in these elections than it is for statewide and presidential elections.
Where this all points is in the direction of low-information primaries producing nominees who appeal to extremely partisan electorates, leading into general elections where party ID trumps nearness to the median voter. This is where the idea of “safe seats” shifts from incumbents to parties — these are districts in which voters are pulling the lever for the party without knowing or caring much about who the candidate is. Once they get to Washington, fealty to the movement and service to the party become the most important thing. What’s so incredible about this is that it might be as close as the US has ever come to installing a parliamentary system. The problem is that the rest of our system isn’t designed to handle a parliament — the Senate gets in the way, the President gets in the way, the 10th Amendment gets in the way, etc. Our House has to push as hard as it can to get through all those veto points, and as long as its relatively undisciplined among its parties, that’s fine. A House that is discretely divided is going to have a tendency to break our system, and that tendency isn’t going to go away when the present crisis ends.
Filed: We R in Control || 20:02, October 5 || View Comments
Nothing much to add to this, but half of Republicans believe that ACORN, an organization that no longer exists, stole the election for Barack Obama:
49% of GOP voters nationally say they think that ACORN stole the election for President Obama. We found that 52% of Republicans thought that ACORN stole the 2008 election for Obama, so this is a modest decline, but perhaps smaller than might have been expected given that ACORN doesn’t exist anymore.
The crosstabs show a slightly larger percentage of “very conservative” respondents believing ACORN stole the election (53%), and I wonder if this is the sort of question where ideology trumps partisanship, even though it’s typically the other way around. Republican leaders are going to have a politically tough time talking about ACORN in specific for obvious reasons (e.g., it doesn’t exist anymore), but the ideological leaders of very conservative voters may not be restrained by such “reality-based” concerns.
There’s also some very interesting fake knowledge stuff from the same poll:
The 39% of Americans with an opinion about Bowles/Simpson is only slightly higher than the 25% with one about Panetta/Burns, a mythical Clinton Chief of Staff/former western Republican Senator combo we conceived of to test how many people would say they had an opinion even about something that doesn’t exist.
Bowles/Simpson does have bipartisan support from the small swath of Americans with an opinion about it. Republicans support it 26/18, Democrats favor it 21/14, and independents are for it by a 24/18 margin. Panetta/Burns doesn’t fare as well with 8% support and 17% opposition.
I’ve been curious about the assertion of fake knowledge for quite a while (I conducted a study way back when that found people claiming more knowledge about a fake race riot story than the real Canadian elections), and I wonder if there isn’t a connection there to the belief gap mechanism.
Filed: Science Is Real || 9:36, December 13 || View Comments
The levers of power are inherently political, Michigan edition:
The state House of Representatives voted 58-51 today to pass a right-to-work bill for public employees, and 58-52 on a bill for private sector workers.
Both right-to-work bills have already passed the Senate. All that is needed now is Gov. Rick Snyder’s signature and Michigan becomes the 24th right-to-work state.
In a parliamentary manuever, the House Republicans asked for a reconsideration of the bill to keep Democrats from asking for the same thing, which would have delayed final passage until Wednesday. Technically, the Republicans could remove that request later today and the bills will automatically head to Snyder.
It almost goes without saying that the Michigan GOP didn’t campaign on this in 2012, and that Snyder even testified earlier this year before the U.S. Congress that right-to-work wasn’t right for Michigan. But much the way traditional norms of government have been violated up and down the ladder of power over the past couple decades, so it is. The disparate protest movements that rose up in Wisconsin, Ohio and elsewhere in 2011 failed to congeal into something broader, and that’s left Michigan vulnerable. It’s left state employees in Illinois to watch their pensions be stolen. And wherever else it’s possible, it will happen there, too.
Rep. Brandon Dillon — inexplicably elected as a Democrat from Grand Rapids — railed against this bill, saying that it’s only being shoved through now because the votes won’t be there in the 2013 session. Maybe that’s true, but it elides the point a little bit. It’s being shoved through now because this is the period of least accountable power. It’s why George W. Bush tried to privatize Social Security immediately as his second term began, it’s why Scott Walker went after the unions only weeks after being sworn in, and it’s why there’s such demand for a bipartisan “Grand Bargain” to keep rich people’s taxes low and destroy entitlements.
President Obama has thrown his weight behind the unions (which he somewhat conspicuously didn’t do in Wisconsin), and that’s big, but it’s probably too late. It’s entirely possible that Michigan unions are simply screwed. Even if the momentum built this week is enough to drive Snyder from office in 2014, keep in mind that when Tom Barrett ran against Scott Walker in the Wisconsin recall, he never promised to repeal Walker’s unionbusting bill. In Michigan, there’s no guarantee that Snyder’s replacement (with the help of a Democratic legislature) would undo this. (And if you want close coverage of the Michigan protests, follow Eclectablog.)
Voters with a union member in their household voted 40% for Mitt Romney. In 2008, it was 39% for McCain. That’s about 7% of all voters casting their ballots in favor of the gun that’s pointed at their own feet. Typically I’m happy to blame voters for their own bad outcomes, but in this case I think it’s a tremendous failure of imagination on the part of the Democratic Party. Get half of those voters back and you win every election forever. This ought to be the mandate for the politically unshackled and, yes, largely unaccountable second Obama term: Look for the union label.
Filed: We R in Control || 15:00, December 11 || View Comments
In this year’s MAPOR panel, Ken Blake’s presentation looked at belief that Barack Obama was born outside the United States, and Doug Hindman talked a bit about right-wing denial of the September unemployment numbers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Both issues are good example cases for a phenomenon that we might call belief reversion.
Filed: Super Special Questions || 19:51, November 23 || View Comments
At MAPOR on Friday, we had another terrific session dealing with the belief gap and extremes in partisanship — a direct follow-up to the belief gap session we had in 2011. We were fortunate enough to get the entire set of participants back together, and had a big audience and a good discussion at the end.
Closing out the panel, Doug Hindman presented a nice overview of how knowledge gaps and belief gaps differ, which is really a narrow set of fairly subtle characteristics. He began his presentation by noting that he’s come more and more to see belief gaps as a particular kind of knowledge gap. Specifically, these are instances where the “knowledge” deals with politically disputed information, and where partisan elites (Doug mentioned “elected officials,” but I think we need to be able to include people like, for example, Rush Limbaugh here) make claims both supporting or denying that knowledge. Consistent with Zaller’s work on elite cuing, we should (and do) see partisans — particularly stronger and more educated partisans — taking up the incorrect beliefs put forth by their partisan elites.
This is also consistent with my findings, presented just one slot earlier, that partisans can respond to hostility toward their partisan identity by putting forth exaggerated incorrect beliefs. In particular, my study found that strong Republicans were especially susceptible to priming effects on their partisan beliefs about Barack Obama (e.g., birtherism) when primed to think negatively about Obama, and to policy-related beliefs when primed by a negative assessment of Mitt Romney.
Filed: Super Special Questions || 9:25, November 20 || View Comments
It’s never the same thing, but it’s always something. American presidential elections are horrible things, though I can’t say whether they’re any more or less horrible than other countries’. Ours are sinkholes of mendacity and gamesmanship, in which winning is measured by the players in skim and by the public in the desperate hope that things don’t get any worse. At best, the campaign provides a distraction from the fact that our government is designed to fail, the institutional version of Monty Burns’s million diseases all getting in one another’s way. A public mismatched with its responsibility will again send a divided government to rule a structure that even one party could never reliably handle, expecting the president to “reach out” to the other side, and for the parties to “come together,” as if these magic words will erase the serious and deep divisions between them on fundamental issues of policy, values, and beliefs. If we’re lucky, only one incompetent or corrupt local election official will screw up thousands of ballots, and the winners will be known before the morning after Election Day; if so, we’ll be ready to leap right into Decision 2016. The lessons we will have learned this year are that truth, on every level, is valueless in the gate-kept circle of Hell inhabited by the Gang of 500; that because money couldn’t buy the presidency or the Senate, it’s OK if it buys mayors and judges; and that everyone who uses science to correctly predict things is just getting lucky or at least gay. We’ll play out this psychodrama again in four years, because most of us have no choice.
And now, on to the predictions!
I made a friendly wager that Barack Obama would defeat Mitt Romney well before the Republican primaries began, and I see no reason to deviate from that prediction now. His electoral vote margin will be smaller than it was in 2008, losing six votes to post-census shuffling, and then losing Indiana (11 votes), Florida (29 votes), North Carolina (15 votes) and the 2nd district of Nebraska (1 vote). All the other states will hold steady, for an Obama win with 303 votes to Romney’s 235. Obama will also become the first president to be elected a second time with a lower share of the popular vote than he got the first time since Grover Cleveland returned to the White House in 1892 with slightly less than he’d won in 1884. A final tally of 51% for Obama and 48% for Romney (rounded) will also indirectly point to the incredible disappearance of Gary Johnson, who had been seen as having the potential to swing New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and maybe even Colorado. Total votes cast for president will be around 135 million.
Democrats will retain control of the Senate, flipping seats in Massachusetts and Maine (via Dem-caucusing independent Angus King), while Republicans take Nebraska and Montana. The push on Election Day will leave the Senate split 53 to 47. Democrats will gain five seats overall in the House of Representatives, but will be well short of a majority, leaving John Boehner with the Speaker’s gavel by a count of 237 to 198. I’d like to be wrong about that one, but I have a hard time seeing where 20 more seats are going to come from.
Effete liberals, commies, moochers and anti-colonialists, let’s get out there and make it happen.
Filed: We R in Control || 15:08, November 5 || View Comments
In the PhD program where I teach, we’re currently conducting a self-study as part of a broader program review. This program serves a broad array of scholarly interests, and includes faculty who teach and study journalism, advertising, broadcast media, film, photography, and myriad other areas relating to mass communication and media. Our students are similarly broad in their interests and backgrounds, some entering the program with clear research agendas in mind and others using their first year as a feeling-out period in which to learn what they most want to learn about.
During the course of our review, the entire faculty, as well as the committee that’s managing the review, has engaged in discussions that often invoke perceived needs, wants, or attitudes of our students. Much of this perception has developed through individual professors’ contact with individual students, and as researchers, we soon realized we were basing a large part of our effort on that most dreaded source of information: anecdata. As a result, we organized a focus group of PhD students, run by the student representative to our graduate committee. While some of the concerns raised pertain to specifics of our program, many of them relate to how graduate education in mass communication works generally.
One set of student concerns that likely applies to most doctoral programs is a desire among students for courses providing more depth in specific theoretical areas, and courses that ground methodological instruction in the context of mass communication. Coming out of the familiar, first-year, introductory theory classes — “Foundations of Theory,” “Theoretical Traditions,” “Issues in Theory” — the students’ consistent concern was in finding courses that brought them deep focus on the particular theories and topics that interested them, even beyond extant courses such as Political Communication or Social Media. This was true of senior students as well as first-year students who were still looking forward to where the rest of their program would take them. A related concern came up in terms of methods courses. Although both basic and advanced statistics are offered to the entire campus by our educational psychology department (as is the case at many universities), and other advanced methods courses can be found in sociology and psychology departments, a strong desire was expressed for advanced methods courses grounded in the communications context — communications ethnography, or experiments with media stimuli, for example.
As the committee reviewed the focus group notes, there was a quick consensus that the ability to offer these courses would be great. Who wouldn’t want to offer that kind of material, and from our perspective as educators, who wouldn’t want the opportunity to teach such focused courses with highly interested and motivated students? But the discussion took a dark turn when someone said the “f”-word: “fill,” as in, “Would these courses fill?” In most cases they probably wouldn’t, even if there were professors available to be pulled out of other courses to teach them. More specialized courses are, by definition, niche endeavors, and given university-mandated enrollment requirements, they’re much harder to fill on a regular basis. Occasional special topics courses were mooted as the best alternative to specialized courses in the catalog, but one other possibility squarely hit the other major concern raised in the focus group.
Students wanted more opportunities to work with faculty on research, across the breadth of our program. Some already work as RAs, or are part of informal research groups; others weren’t sure how to get involved with professors with whom they hadn’t taken courses. Could collaborative independent studies be an answer to both issues? This is one idea that is being considered. Another is a faculty research symposium at the beginning of fall semester, which would mirror the student symposium we hold near the end of spring semester. Taken together, these efforts would introduce faculty areas of research specialty and expertise, as well as present a structure in which to follow up with collaborative work. It also makes for a new twist on the classic model of mass communication PhD programs, allowing for a greater range of theoretical and methodological approaches to become part of a student’s education, but also requiring more flexibility and informal teaching on the part of faculty. The challenges of the informal model are clear, but the opportunities are clear as well. As our field continues to evolve — and in particular, as the ways our programs are funded continue to evolve — making those opportunities work should be a top priority for graduate faculty.
Filed: Leave Them Kids Alone || 9:50, November 3 || View Comments
I’m not going to write these books, but I offer them up as a public service to others in need of high-concept ideas to pitch to publishers.
- Also, Too: Vice-Presidential Candidates’ Campaign Readiness, From Garner to Palin
- “Indeed,” Said the Blogger: How Content Replication Makes the Web Look 100 Times Bigger Than It Is
- TelePrimping: A Collection of Jabs About Barack Obama’s TelePrompter Usage That Were Delivered Via TelePrompter
- Bigger, Better, Faster, More: The Incredible Accomplishments of Paul Ryan
OK, back to finishing ICA papers.
Filed: Science Is Real || 1:23, November 2 || View Comments
I turn 33⅓ today, and while I’m not spinning any LPs, it does seem like a good day to get into this little self-analysis.
I’m not just a quantitative researcher; I am dispositionally quantitative. I think in terms of numbers about just about anything for which that makes sense. I also love music. So naturally, my iTunes library is loaded with song ratings, which I’ve used to do a little investigation of my trends in finding new, much-loved records.
Concurrent to this, I’ve read somewhere or other that the music you love at 24 is what you stick with for the rest of your life. So let’s see what we’ve got here. I started really paying attention to music in 1991, the year I turned 12. The chart to the right shows the trends in overall rating of my favorite album from each of the last 21 years, as well as my #5, #10 and #15 (I haven’t got ratings for 10 from 1991 or 1992). What we see is that my teenage years generally have higher ceilings than my 20s, but that the mid-range stuff stays fairly steady until a sudden and horrible drop-off the year I turned 29. Now that I’m a third of the way through my 30s, things are just continuing to decline.
What got me thinking about this was a quote from a recent Neil Young interview: “Piracy is the new radio.” The ability to be exposed to exponentially more music than I was ever exposed to via commercial radio and MTV has expanded my taste and introduced me to superb bands I would’ve otherwise never known. It even works going back in time — Audiogalaxy’s recommendations led me to Burning Airlines, which led me to J. Robbins’ previous band, Jawbox (piracy also takes over some of the function of used record stores because of this).
At the same time, it’s a lot harder to focus on any of this new stuff. Unless it’s incredibly awesome, a new song or album has a tough time catching enough of my attention to get repeated plays and become a new favorite. This is true of new stuff from old artists, too, which makes me think a lot of it is that I’m old and set in my ways. But who knows? This new environment could privilege breadth of exposure at the expense of depth.